Companion piece to 

 How DFARS and U.S. Based Defense Prime Contractors Are Enforcing Counterfeit Electronic Parts Mitigation 

Introduction

Counterfeit electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts, and counterfeit materiel more broadly, present significant risks to safety, mission assurance, reliability, operational availability, and contractual compliance across the aerospace and defence supply chain. In the United Kingdom defence market, the primary flowdown architecture differs from a US DFARS model. Requirements typically originate with UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) contract conditions, Defence Standards, NATO Allied Quality Assurance Publications (AQAP), NATO standardization recommendations, and customer-specific prime contractor terms, then flow down through major defence OEMs and prime contractors to lower-tier suppliers. 

This paper follows the same practical structure as SMT Corp’s U.S. focused companion paper, but focuses on UK MOD and NATO flowdowns, with examples from BAE Systems, Leonardo, Thales, Airbus, and MBDA. The focus is on how those organisations implement customer and government expectations for counterfeit materiel and counterfeit electronic parts prevention through sourcing, traceability, inspection, testing, reporting, non-conformance control, obsolescence management, and lower-tier supplier flowdown. 

Important scope note: the UK MOD framework uses the broader term “counterfeit materiel”. That term includes electronic components, but also applies to other parts, raw material, software, equipment, documentation, packaging, certification status, configuration, prior-use status, and other characteristics that may be falsely represented. This paper therefore treats counterfeit electronic parts as a high-risk subset of the wider MOD/NATO counterfeit materiel problem.

UK MOD and NATO-Level Requirements 
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UK MOD DEF STAN 05-135 – Avoidance of Counterfeit Materiel 

The core UK MOD anti-counterfeit flowdown is DEF STAN 05-135, Avoidance of Counterfeit Materiel. Issue 2 states that the standard defines arrangements a supplier must establish to demonstrate that it is actively planning and managing counterfeit materiel risk in its organisation and supply chain to prevent delivery of counterfeit materiel to the MOD. It may be applied to all materiel procured by the MOD, and the standard notes that the MOD considers its inclusion where AQAP 2100-series requirements are invoked. The current public Issue 3 preview further indicates application to materiel procured by, or on behalf of, the MOD where risk has been identified, including materiel used in delivery of services or outcomes to MOD. [1] 

Key flowdown requirements include: 

• Anti-Counterfeiting Management Plan (ACMP): 

  Suppliers are expected to maintain a defined, documented counterfeit avoidance policy and ACMP addressing prevention, detection, control, reporting, disposition, and supply-chain risk management. 

• Leadership accountability: 

  Top management must ensure counterfeit avoidance policy is communicated, understood, and implemented; a management representative must have authority to maintain arrangements, escalate concerns, and promote awareness. 

• Competence and awareness: 

  Suppliers must define role-based awareness and competence requirements, meet training needs, and maintain records of training, skills, and competence. 

• Purchasing risk assessment and flowdown: 

  Suppliers must assess and record counterfeit procurement risk, considering the criticality of the materiel to safety and performance. Where risk is identified, suppliers must flow down the standard, an appropriate sector scheme or standard, and criticality information to the supply chain. 

• Traceability to manufacturer: 

  Where product integrity is important, suppliers must be able to trace the source of supply through the chain to the manufacturer. Inability to procure directly from, or trace back to, the manufacturer is an additional risk that must be managed. 

• Risk-based inspection and testing: 

  Inspection and test rigour must be commensurate with the risk that materiel is counterfeit and with its safety/performance criticality. Additional testing should be considered when counterfeit materiel is suspected. 

• Control of non-conforming materiel: 

  Suspect counterfeit materiel must be controlled to prevent unintended use or re-entry into the supply chain. Confirmed counterfeit materiel must not re-enter the supply chain and must not be returned to the sub-supplier. 

• Mandatory reporting: 

  Counterfeit occurrences must be reported to the customer, supplier of the materiel, owner of relevant intellectual property rights, appropriate data-gathering organisations, and national law enforcement authorities. In the UK, the standard notes Police and Trading Standards. 

• Obsolescence management: 

  Suppliers must maintain measures to prevent counterfeit products entering the supply chain when managing obsolescence risks and must implement a robust Obsolescence Management Plan aligned with BS EN 62402. 

The standard also identifies related standards and references that are highly relevant to counterfeit electronic parts and test-flow design, including IEC/TS 62668-1, IEC 62668-2, SAE AS5553, SAE AS6081, SAE AS6171, SAE AS6174, SAE ARP6178, SAE ARP6328, DEFCON 627 for Certificates of Conformity, DEFCON 524 for rejection, the Counterfeit Avoidance Working Group / Counterfeit Avoidance Maturity Model, and BS EN 62402 for obsolescence management. These references help bridge the MOD counterfeit-materiel requirement to electronic component management, distributor assessment, authentication test planning, and open-market sourcing controls. [1] 

NATO counterfeit avoidance and quality assurance requirements 

For NATO and multinational programmes, counterfeit avoidance is reinforced by NATO standardization and quality assurance documents. The most directly relevant NATO counterfeit-specific reference is STANREC 4791, Avoidance of Counterfeit Material in the Defence Supply Chain, Edition 2:2023, which lists recommended practices for the avoidance of counterfeit materiel and recommends standards that can be used in the defence supply chain. NATO AQAP-2021, Edition A Version 1:2023, provides guidance for avoidance of counterfeit materiel in the supply chain. [2] 

The broader AQAP quality framework is also important because it is how many NATO customer quality expectations become contractual flowdowns. DEF STAN 05-135 references AQAP-2110, NATO Quality Assurance Requirements for Design, Development and Production; AQAP-2310, NATO Quality Management System Requirements for Aviation, Space and Defence Suppliers; and AQAP-2131, NATO Quality Assurance Requirements for Final Inspection and Test. These documents are not substitutes for a counterfeit-specific process, but they provide the quality system, inspection, final test, configuration, records, and customer assurance framework in which counterfeit avoidance requirements are operationalised. [3] 

Practical effect: where MOD, NATO, or programme-specific requirements are invoked in a purchase order, counterfeit avoidance is not only a receiving inspection issue. It becomes a risk-managed supply-chain obligation requiring documented planning, authorised-source preference, objective evidence, traceability, inspection/test rigour, reporting, non-conformance control, and lower-tier supplier flowdown. 

Major UK and European Defence Contractor Flowdown Examples 

Large defence companies in the UK and European defence supply chain generally implement MOD/NATO expectations through purchase terms and conditions, supplier quality requirements, special conditions, approved-source requirements, and programme-specific flowdowns. The clauses below are not identical across companies, but they show a consistent operational model: suppliers are expected to deliver authentic, conforming product; preserve traceability and objective evidence; notify and support investigation of suspect counterfeit material; replace or remediate nonconforming product at supplier cost; and flow relevant requirements to sub-tier suppliers. 

BAE Systems UK 

BAE Systems Standard Conditions of Purchase (2025 Edition, effective 19 August 2025) contain explicit counterfeit-goods provisions in Clause 22 and supporting documentation controls in Clause 3. BAE Systems expects and encourages suppliers to use parts purchased from the original equipment manufacturer, original component manufacturer, or authorised sources. Suppliers must ensure conforming product and prevent Counterfeit Goods from being delivered. If a supplier becomes aware of or suspects Counterfeit Goods, it must notify BAE Systems using non-conforming / escapes / alerts processes, provide documentation authenticating the affected goods, provide traceability of the sourcing route where applicable, and support investigation. If Counterfeit Goods have been delivered, the supplier must replace them with genuine conforming goods at its own expense and is liable for removal, replacement, reinsertion, and testing costs. [4] 

BAE also requires delivery documentation such as customs export documents, advice notes, certificates of conformity, and civil approved certificates. If the supplier is not the original manufacturer, it must provide copies of the original manufacturer certificate of conformity or civil approved certificate, plus technical evidence such as test figures and heat-treatment particulars where applicable. These provisions do not, in the provided purchase terms, call out AS5553, AS6081, AS6171, or lot/date-code traceability as named counterfeit electronic-parts standards. However, they create a clear contractual basis for authorised-source expectation, authentication documentation, sourcing-route traceability, investigation support, replacement, and cost liability. 

Leonardo UK 

Leonardo EDS UK General Conditions of Purchase, Rev. 7.00, contain some of the strongest explicit counterfeit and electronic/electrical traceability language in the reviewed UK terms. Condition 6.2 requires certification that goods and services have been tested and inspected and conform to drawings and order requirements, with objective evidence retained and available for review. Condition 16.1 references ISO 9001 or AS9100-type quality systems, and Condition 16.2 requires inspection and test records in sufficient detail for verification and evaluation, including product release certification, test certificates, route cards, batch records, serial numbers, and other traceability records. [5] 

Condition 16.3 requires full traceability of parts, materials, equipment, raw material, software tools, and related items from receipt through delivery of the finished article. For parts or materials from the original manufacturer, Leonardo requires traceability to the original component manufacturer including date code and lot code information. For parts obtained through authorised/franchised distributors or agents, traceability to the original component manufacturer is required. For non-standard procurement routes, the supplier must still provide traceability or take steps to ensure provenance, and other sources require prior purchaser approval plus evidence authenticating the supply chain to the OCM and confirming the items are new, unused, and authentic. 

Condition 17 defines Suspect Counterfeit Goods and Counterfeit Goods, includes identity attributes such as original manufacturer, part number, date code, lot number, test methods/results, inspection, documentation, origin, tampering, salvage/recycling, ownership history, packaging, physical condition, and previous use or rejection, and warrants that Counterfeit Goods will not be supplied. It further requires only new, unused, authentic items, impoundment of counterfeit or suspect counterfeit goods, prompt replacement with acceptable goods, supplier liability for impoundment/removal/replacement costs, possible government authority notification, and flowdown of the Condition 17 provisions to all lower-tier contracts. Condition 38 separately supports customer flowdowns by allowing material customer provisions to be incorporated as special conditions. [5] 

Thales UK 

Thales UK has a public Counterfeit Avoidance / Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items resource that defines suspect, fraudulent, and counterfeit parts and states that Thales and its suppliers, subcontractors, and distributors must demonstrate due diligence when sourcing material and prevent fraudulent/counterfeit material from entering the supply chain. Thales UK supplier information also emphasises strict compliance with certifications, laws, and regulations from suppliers. [6] 

Thales General Terms and Conditions of Purchase, dated 05 May 2025, reinforce the counterfeit-avoidance framework through general warranty and conformity obligations. The supplier warrants that supplies comply with the product data sheet, technical specifications, statement of work, order terms, legal requirements, and good industry standards; the warranty covers repair or replacement at the purchaser discretion; and the supplier remains liable for loss caused by non-compliant supply. For counterfeit electronic parts flowdown, Thales purchase orders and special conditions should therefore be read alongside Thales counterfeit-avoidance requirements, supplier quality requirements, and any programme-specific MOD/NATO/DFARS clauses incorporated into the order. [6] 

Airbus 

The Airbus Standard Terms and Conditions of Purchase and Supply, England and Wales Law Version (November 2024) contain strong quality, approved-source, documentation, traceability, product escape, and subcontractor compliance requirements that support counterfeit avoidance when MOD, NATO, or customer counterfeit requirements are invoked as order requirements or specific conditions. [7] 

Relevant Airbus controls include: a supplier QMS that must comply with Airbus requirements and, as applicable, IAQG 9100 or 9120; use of Airbus-approved sources and Airbus-qualified data lists for standard parts, specified items, special processes, and test methods used for aeronautical items; manufacturer Certificates of Conformity with order number, part number, quantity, date of manufacture and expiration where applicable; immediate notification of product quality escapes using an IAQG 9131-type process; incoming material inspection; complete identification and traceability of related products to raw material and applicable documentation; trained and qualified personnel; and subcontracting controls requiring prior consent for substantial subcontracted work and continued supplier responsibility for subcontractor compliance. These provisions are especially relevant for lower-tier suppliers who must prove provenance, records, approved source usage, and conformity when an open-market sourcing decision or nonconforming material issue arises. 

MBDA 

MBDA General Terms and Conditions of Purchase, 644963-v12, contain quality, delivery documentation, Certificate of Conformity, rejection, warranty, and access-to-records/access-to-premises provisions. MBDA counterfeit avoidance for a specific defence programme may be implemented through special conditions, quality requirements, customer flowdowns, statements of work, or programme-specific MOD/NATO terms, rather than solely through the general conditions. [8] 

The MBDA general conditions provide useful authenticity-adjacent controls. Delivery documentation must identify country of origin, part and drawing numbers, quantities, and include a Certificate of Conformity. Where relevant, the supplier must provide copies of the original manufacturer Certificate of Conformity. Quality clauses require authenticated Certificates of Conformity where required, reasonable access for the customer and end user to the supplier and lower-tier subcontractors for quality verification, and delivered items that are fit for purpose, conform to specification, and are free from actual or latent defects. Nonconforming items may be rejected, replaced, repaired, or refunded.  

Cross-industry observations 

• Authorised-source preference is common. 

  BAE states it expects suppliers to purchase parts from OEMs/OCMs or authorised sources; Leonardo allows OCMs, OCM-authorised/franchised distributors, or authorised/franchised aftermarket manufacturers unless the purchaser approves otherwise; Airbus controls approved sources through Airbus-qualified data lists. 

• Traceability and objective evidence drive acceptance. 

  Leonardo is explicit on OCM, date-code, and lot-code traceability; BAE requires authentication documentation and sourcing-route traceability when counterfeit is suspected; Airbus and MBDA require conformity documentation and records that support verification. 

• Non-standard/open-market sourcing is elevated risk. 

  DEF STAN 05-135 treats inability to procure directly from, or trace to, the manufacturer as an additional risk. Leonardo expressly requires approval and provenance evidence for non-standard routes.  

• Counterfeit controls are often blended with quality controls. 

  Some terms are explicit counterfeit clauses; others rely on quality, inspection, CoC, traceability, escape notification, rejection, and subcontracting provisions. Supplier quality clauses and special conditions are therefore critical. 

• Supplier liability is an enforcement mechanism. 

  BAE and Leonardo expressly allocate replacement, removal, testing, impoundment, or investigation-related costs to the supplier for counterfeit or suspect counterfeit goods. MBDA and Airbus provide general rejection, repair/replacement, and liability tools for nonconforming items. 

• Lower-tier flowdown is not optional on high-risk programmes. 

  DEF STAN 05-135 requires flowdown of the standard or an appropriate scheme/standard where risk is identified. Leonardo expressly flows down Condition 17 to lower tiers. Airbus and BAE require subcontracting consent/controls and supplier responsibility; special conditions should make counterfeit avoidance flowdown explicit. 

Brief DFARS and US Prime Contractor Overlay 

Although this paper is intentionally focused on the UK MOD and NATO defence market, UK-based suppliers and UK operations of global defence companies often support US Department of Defense programmes or supply US defence prime contractors. In those cases, DFARS 252.246-7007, Contractor Counterfeit Electronic Part Detection and Avoidance System, and DFARS 252.246-7008, Sources of Electronic Parts, may be flowed down through the contract. Those clauses reinforce concepts already familiar in the MOD/NATO framework: risk-based detection and avoidance systems, traceability, trusted sourcing, industry standards such as AS5553/AS6081/AS6171, reporting, quarantine/control, and flowdown to subcontractors. [9] 

The recommended operating model for UK suppliers is therefore not to build a US-only counterfeit programme and then add UK requirements as an afterthought. A stronger approach is to build a DEF STAN 05-135 / NATO AQAP / STANREC 4791-based counterfeit avoidance framework, then add DFARS-specific controls, GIDEP/reporting obligations, and US prime contractor clauses as contract-specific overlays. Lockheed Martin, RTX/Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, L3Harris, and other US-headquartered primes have meaningful UK defence activity; however, their detailed US flowdowns are not repeated here because they were covered in the companion paper. 

Recommended Supplier Flowdowns Based on DEF STAN, NATO Requirements, and Industry Best Practices 

The following recommended flowdowns are drafted for purchase orders, supplier quality requirements, special conditions, or enterprise supplier agreements involving UK MOD, NATO, or UK defence prime contractor work. They are intended to align with DEF STAN 05-135, NATO STANREC 4791 / AQAP-2021 guidance, AQAP quality expectations, and recognised industry standards. They should be tailored to the specific order, part criticality, customer requirements, and governing contract. 

1. General Obligation 

The Supplier shall ensure that all materiel, including EEE parts, assemblies, raw material, software, documentation, packaging, and other deliverables supplied under the Contract are authentic, conforming, new unless otherwise authorised, and free from counterfeit, fraudulent, suspect counterfeit, or misrepresented materiel. The Supplier shall establish, implement, and maintain processes to prevent counterfeit materiel from entering its organisation or supply chain in accordance with DEF STAN 05-135 and any applicable MOD, NATO, customer, or industry standard invoked by the Contract. 

2. Anti-Counterfeiting Management Plan 

The Supplier shall maintain a documented Anti-Counterfeiting Management Plan (ACMP) proportionate to materiel criticality and counterfeit risk. The ACMP shall address prevention, supplier selection, purchasing risk assessment, authorised sourcing, traceability, incoming inspection, test and verification, control and disposition, reporting, corrective action, obsolescence, training, and lower-tier flowdown. The ACMP shall be approved by Supplier senior management and made available to the Buyer upon request. 

3. Leadership, Responsibility, and Escalation 

The Supplier shall assign executive responsibility for counterfeit risk management and designate a management representative with authority to implement counterfeit-avoidance controls, report concerns to senior management, escalate suspect/confirmed counterfeit cases, and promote awareness within the organisation and supply chain. 

4. Competence, Training, and Awareness 

The Supplier shall ensure that personnel performing purchasing, inspection, receiving, quality, engineering, programme management, obsolescence management, and supplier quality activities affecting materiel authenticity are trained and competent. Training records shall be retained and made available to the Buyer upon request. 

5. Approved Sourcing and Traceability 

The Supplier shall procure parts and materiel directly from the original manufacturer, original component manufacturer, original equipment manufacturer, authorised/franchised distributors, authorised aftermarket manufacturers, or other Buyer-approved sources. The Supplier shall verify and maintain objective evidence of traceability to the manufacturer, including manufacturer Certificate of Conformity, authorised distributor certification, purchase records, lot/date code information for electronic components where available or required, chain-of-custody evidence, and test/inspection records. 

6. Non-Franchised, Broker, Surplus, or Open-Market Procurement 

The Supplier shall not procure parts or materiel from brokers, independent distributors, surplus sources, marketplaces, or any source that cannot provide manufacturer traceability unless the Supplier has obtained prior written Buyer approval. Requests for approval shall include the business reason for using the source, obsolescence or availability analysis, supplier risk assessment, traceability available, proposed inspection and test plan, chain-of-custody controls, counterfeit risk mitigations, and the impact of the part on safety, performance, mission assurance, and schedule. 

7. Risk-Based Inspection, Test, and Verification 

The Supplier shall determine and document the rigour of inspection, test, and verification using a quantitative risk scoring process based on, at minimum, source/channel risk, traceability, part criticality, safety or mission consequence, obsolescence, supplier history, complexity, programmability or connectivity, jurisdictional exposure, and counterfeit-risk indicators. The scoring process shall classify parts and sources into risk tiers, with heightened controls for high-consequence applications and for high-risk sources such as reclaimed parts, grey/open-market sources, unlicensed distributors, sources with unverifiable certificates, licensed or private-label manufacturing, high-risk jurisdictional exposure, and newly approved or unproven authorised distributors. 

Where materiel is procured from non-authorised, non-traceable, open-market, obsolete, suspect, or otherwise high-risk sources, the Supplier shall perform Buyer-approved authentication testing using recognised standards or processes such as SAE AS6171, IEC 62668-2, SAE AS5553, SAE AS6174, or an equivalent Buyer-approved method. For EEE parts, the authentication plan should, where practicable, identify the expected effectiveness of the proposed test sequence using a quantitative coverage method such as Counterfeit Defect Coverage (CDC), identify not-covered or under-covered risks, and add physical, electrical, functional, firmware/configuration, or cyber-physical verification where the risk score, coverage gap, anomaly, or high-consequence end use indicates that baseline inspection is insufficient. 

8. Receiving Inspection and Documentation Package 

Each delivery shall include the documentation required by the Contract, which may include Certificate of Conformity, manufacturer Certificate of Conformity, authorised distributor certification, traceability records, country of origin, part number, revision, order number, quantity, lot/date code, shelf-life/date of manufacture where applicable, export-control classification where applicable, inspection and test data, and any Buyer-approved deviation, concession, or permit. The Supplier shall retain records in a controlled manner for the period required by the Contract and applicable law. 

9. Control, Impoundment, and Disposition 

The Supplier shall establish arrangements to identify, segregate, control, and prevent unintended use or re-entry of suspect counterfeit, confirmed counterfeit, or otherwise nonconforming materiel. Suspect counterfeit materiel shall not be returned to a sub-supplier except under controlled circumstances for validation or testing and only with Buyer knowledge. Confirmed counterfeit materiel shall not be returned to the supply chain and shall be disposed of securely in accordance with Buyer direction and applicable law. 

10. Notification and Reporting 

The Supplier shall notify the Buyer immediately, or as otherwise required by the Contract, if the Supplier becomes aware of, suspects, receives, identifies, or delivers counterfeit or suspect counterfeit materiel. The notice shall include affected part numbers, quantities, lot/date codes, purchase order numbers, source of supply, traceability available, test/inspection results, installed or delivered locations, containment actions, and proposed corrective action. The Supplier shall support Buyer reporting to the customer, original manufacturer/IP owner, relevant authorities, and data-sharing organisations such as BEAMA, ERAI, GIDEP where contractually applicable, Police, Trading Standards, or other required bodies. 

11. Obsolescence Management 

The Supplier shall maintain an Obsolescence Management Plan proportionate to the supplied materiel and shall manage obsolescence in a way that prevents counterfeit or misrepresented products from entering the supply chain. Obsolescence plans shall consider lifecycle monitoring, last-time buys, approved alternates, redesign, customer approval, controlled storage, traceability preservation, and risk-based test and authentication when obsolete parts are sourced outside authorised channels. Where applicable, the plan shall align with BS EN 62402. 

12. Lower-Tier Supplier Flowdown 

The Supplier shall flow the substance of these counterfeit avoidance requirements, including applicable DEF STAN, NATO AQAP/STANREC, customer, and industry-standard requirements, to all lower-tier suppliers that provide materiel, parts, assemblies, services, testing, inspection, or processing affecting the deliverable. The Supplier shall ensure lower-tier compliance and shall notify the Buyer immediately if a lower-tier supplier is unable or unwilling to comply. 

13. Audit, Access, and Objective Evidence 

The Buyer, its customer, regulatory authorities, and government quality assurance representatives, where applicable, shall have reasonable access to Supplier and relevant lower-tier supplier facilities, records, inspection/test data, purchasing records, traceability evidence, and ACMP evidence to verify compliance. The Supplier shall not destroy relevant counterfeit avoidance, quality, inspection, traceability, or test records without Buyer approval where the Contract requires retention. 

14. Replacement, Cost Liability, and Corrective Action 

If counterfeit, suspect counterfeit, or nonconforming materiel is furnished, the Supplier shall promptly contain the issue, support investigation, replace the affected materiel with genuine conforming materiel acceptable to the Buyer, and perform corrective and preventive action. Unless otherwise stated in the Contract, the Supplier shall be liable for costs associated with containment, investigation support, removal, replacement, reinstallation, re-test, validation, shipping, and related Buyer or customer impacts caused by the counterfeit or nonconforming materiel. 

15. Contractual Overlays 

Where the Contract supports US DoD or US prime contractor work, the Supplier shall also comply with DFARS 252.246-7007, DFARS 252.246-7008, and any flowed-down US prime contractor counterfeit electronic-parts provisions incorporated in the Contract. These requirements supplement, and do not replace, applicable MOD, NATO, customer, and Buyer-specific counterfeit avoidance requirements. 

Supporting Compliance When Open-Market Sourcing Is Required 

UK MOD and NATO flowdowns generally prioritise original manufacturers, authorised/franchised distributors, approved sources, and traceability to manufacturer. In practice, obsolescence, allocation, defence platform life-extension, diminishing manufacturing sources, and urgent operational needs can create legitimate open-market sourcing events. In those cases, compliance does not end; it becomes more rigorous. 

• Document the reason authorised-channel sourcing is not feasible, including obsolescence or availability evidence. 

• Obtain Buyer approval before placing the order with an independent, surplus, broker, or other non-franchised source. 

• Perform a source risk assessment and preserve chain-of-custody and transaction records. 

• Specify an authentication test plan based on SAE AS6171, IEC 62668-2, AS5553, AS6174, or an agreed equivalent process commensurate with part risk and criticality. 

• Use accredited test laboratories, as appropriate, to provide objective evidence supporting authenticity, conformance, and risk-based acceptance. 

• Treat anomalies, provenance gaps, inconsistent markings, reclaimed/reworked indicators, suspect documentation, or failed tests as triggers for containment, escalation, additional verification, and customer notification. 

The goal is not merely to find obsolete parts. The goal is to create a defensible technical and contractual record showing that counterfeit risk was recognised, approved, tested, controlled, and flowed through the supply chain in a way that protects the MOD/NATO customer, the prime contractor, and the platform. 

Conclusion 

UK defence counterfeit flowdown is best understood as a layered system. DEF STAN 05-135 establishes the MOD risk-management baseline for counterfeit materiel. NATO STANREC 4791 and AQAP-2021 provide specific NATO counterfeit-avoidance guidance, while AQAP-2110, AQAP-2310, and AQAP-2131 provide the broader quality assurance framework. Major defence companies then translate those requirements into supplier terms, quality manuals, special conditions, approved-source rules, documentation requirements, nonconformance processes, and lower-tier supplier obligations. 

BAE Systems and Leonardo provide clear examples of explicit counterfeit provisions, including authorised-source preference, authentication evidence, traceability, investigation support, replacement, liability, and lower-tier flowdown. Thales public supplier material reinforces due diligence and prevention of fraudulent/counterfeit material. Airbus and MBDA, in the documents reviewed, provide strong quality, documentation, approved-source, traceability, and nonconformance tools that should be supplemented with explicit counterfeit-avoidance special conditions when MOD/NATO risk or electronic component sourcing warrants it. 

For UK suppliers, the practical best practice is to maintain a documented ACMP that is robust enough for MOD/NATO work, integrates recognised industry standards for electronic component authenticity, handles obsolescence and open-market sourcing as elevated risk, and can accept DFARS or US prime contractor overlays when the contract requires them. This approach avoids treating counterfeit avoidance as a US-only compliance item and positions the supplier for UK MOD, NATO, and transatlantic defence programmes. 

References and Source Basis 

[1] UK MOD / Defence Standardization DEF STAN 05-135, Avoidance of Counterfeit Materiel. Supplied source: Issue 2, dated 14 July 2019. Public standards catalogue record also indicates Issue 3, dated 14 April 2026, as current active issue. DStan portal: https://www.dstan.mod.uk ; catalogue preview: https://store.accuristech.com/standards/moduk-def-stan-05-135 

[2] NATO STANREC 4791 STANREC 4791 Edition 2:2023, Avoidance of Counterfeit Material in the Defence Supply Chain; NATO, published 19 June 2023. Public catalogue record: https://www.intertekinform.com/en-gb/standards/stanrec-4791-ed-2-2023-737522_saig_nato_nato_3308612/ 

[3] NATO AQAP references AQAP-2021 Edition A Version 1:2023, NATO Guidance for Avoidance of Counterfeit Materiel in the Supply Chain; AQAP-2110, NATO Quality Assurance Requirements for Design, Development and Production; AQAP-2310, NATO Quality Management System Requirements for Aviation, Space and Defence Suppliers; AQAP-2131, NATO Quality Assurance Requirements for Final Inspection and Test. 

[4] BAE Systems BAE Systems Standard Conditions of Purchase (2025 Edition), effective 19 August 2025, supplied PDF, including Clauses 3 and 22. 

[5] Leonardo UK Leonardo EDS UK General Conditions of Purchase, Rev. 7.00, November 2023, supplied PDF, including Conditions 6, 16, 17, and 38. 

[6] Thales UK Thales UK Counterfeit Avoidance / Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items public supplier resource, June 2025: https://www.thalesgroup.com/sites/default/files/2025-06/ThalesUKCounterfeitAvoidance.pdf ; Thales General Terms and Conditions of Purchase, 05 May 2025: https://www.thalesgroup.com/sites/default/files/2025-09/THALESGENERALTERMSANDCONDITIONSOFPURCHASE05.05.2025.pdf ; Thales UK suppliers page: https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/worldwide/united-kingdom/suppliers 

[7] Airbus Airbus Standard Terms and Conditions of Purchase and Supply, England and Wales Law Version, November 2024, supplied PDF, including Articles 7.2, 7.4, 7.5, and related quality/traceability provisions. 

[8] MBDA MBDA UK Limited, MBDA France and MBDA Italia S.p.A. General Terms and Conditions of Purchase, 644963-v12, supplied PDF, including Conditions 4, 5, 6, 10, and 12. 

[9] US overlay DFARS 252.246-7007, Contractor Counterfeit Electronic Part Detection and Avoidance System, and DFARS 252.246-7008, Sources of Electronic Parts. Use only when flowed down by a US DoD or US prime contractor contract. 

[10] Industry standards referenced by DEF STAN 05-135 or commonly flowed down SAE AS5553, SAE AS6081, SAE AS6171, SAE AS6174, SAE ARP6178, SAE ARP6328, IEC/TS 62668-1, IEC 62668-2, IEC TS/62239, BS EN ISO 9001, BS EN 62402, DEFCON 627, DEFCON 524, and the Counterfeit Avoidance Working Group / Counterfeit Avoidance Maturity Model. 

[11] Existing source papers supplied with this task Government and Industry Best Practices for Counterfeit Flowdown Rev A; UK Terms and Conditions for Counterfeit Stuff; SMT_MoD NATO CA Contract Flow Downs. 

[12] US prime presence in UK – contextual only Official UK-facing pages and public materials for Lockheed Martin UK, Raytheon UK / RTX, and Northrop Grumman UK were reviewed only to support the brief acknowledgement that US prime activity in the UK can create DFARS and US-prime-flowdown overlays.