



Managing Risks of Counterfeit Parts in the Supply Chain CQSDI Special Topic

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
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Conference on Quality in the Space and Defense Industries


March 16, 2010





Counterfeiting Trend


GIDEP Counterfeit Report Submissions



Counterfeiting Trend and Magnitude



Total Counterfeit Incidents:



U.S. Customs Notifications


Year	Number of Incidents
2005	1
2006	29
2007	169
2008	604

Counterfeiting Impact




GIDEP Counterfeit Case Summaries

EE-A-06-01	Test failures at a defense contractor were found to be microcircuits containing many different chips
EE-A-06-03	Supplier of military hardware found suspect counterfeit microcircuits having dual part number markings
EE-A-06-04	Microcircuits that failed product testing were found to have chips from another source
M9-A-07-01	During manufacturing of a military product, suspect counterfeit transistors were functional failures
6E-P-07-01	Memory device supplier confirmed parts marked with their name did not contain their chips
UY7-P-07-01	Microcircuits, that failed electrical testing, were found to contain chips from another manufacturer
NB4-P-07-01	Suspect counterfeit microcircuits, from an unauthorized distributor, found during testing at an aerospace supplier
J5-A-07-01	Independent distributor supplied suspect counterfeit parts (not available from original supplier) to defense plant
J5-A-07-02	Microcircuits, supplied by an independent distributor, were suspect counterfeit (device markings not authentic)
A2W-A-07-01	Suspect counterfeit transistors failed electrical tests; found to have many different chips
J5-A-07-06	Programmable logic devices found to be suspect counterfeit (lot code was after manufacturer discontinued parts)
J5-A-07-09	Microcircuits found to be suspect counterfeit as the lot date code was after the manufacturer stopped production
UE-A-07-01	Suspect counterfeit microcircuits failed electrical tests; contained chips from another manufacturer
AAN-U-08-052	A government entity reported counterfeit circuit breakers in nuclear power plants
CE9-P-08-02	Military parts manufacturer reported U. S. authorities have recently intercepted many counterfeit parts shipments
UL-P-08-01	Distributor unable to provide test reports on suspect counterfeit microcircuits that failed during factory testing
D4-A-09-01	Military hardware manufacturer found suspect counterfeit programmable devices showed part remarking



How Companies Are Uncovering Counterfeits



U.S. Department of Commerce



Managing Risks of Counterfeit Parts in the Supply Chain

Distributor Control

C-SAM

The Ten Commandments

AC3

AS6081

The Way Forward

