In 2011, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) launched an investigation into counterfeit electronic parts in U.S. defense systems [1]. Several instances were investigated, all of which were relatively simple remarked counterfeit electronic parts, which are parts that have been remarked to appear as a new or different part.

The semiconductor industry has long been the foundation of technological innovation, driving progress in virtually every sector from consumer electronics to automotive to communications to military, aerospace, space, energy and beyond.

There is a strong rationale for why integrated sourcing and authentication of open market parts is the most effective approach when performed by a trusted and experienced independent distributor with in-house sourcing and accredited testing capabilities.

In the ever-changing landscape of geopolitical uncertainty and unforeseen global supply chain disruptions, manufacturers must be proactive when making procurement and residual asset disposition decisions. Vulnerabilities exist throughout the complex global semiconductor supply chain. The COVID-19 pandemic is just one example of an unforeseen situation that brought manufacturing to a standstill in many industries.

In 2012, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) concluded a year-long investigation into counterfeit electronic parts.  The investigation found that the total number of suspect counterfeit parts involved in the 1,800 defense case studies investigated exceeded 1 million.

There are many considerations when creating or updating a policy for the mitigation of counterfeit electronic components. The main intention of such a policy is applicable to components sourced from the open market (or gray market). However, the increased threat of clone counterfeits making their way into authorized distribution channels may also necessitate policies to consider components sourced from vulnerable authorized sources, for instance, authorized distribution of Chinese made semiconductors.

While the core testing methods defined in SAE AS6171 Moderate Risk Level 2 (MRL2) can be used to provide invaluable insights regarding the chemical and physical properties of components (External Visual Inspection, Radiological Inspection, XRF, Decapsulation), these methods do not support a determination of whether the components will function as intended by the original component manufacturer (OCM), and by extension, perform per end-customer requirements. Only by the addition of functional and performance testing, can more sophisticated counterfeits, such as clones, be effectively detected.

SMT Corp, the industry leader in counterfeit electrical, electronic and electromechanical (EEE) components mitigation, has announced the expansion of its electrical testing services to include MIL-STD-750 and MIL-STD-883 testing methods.

In the age of globalized manufacturing, the supply chain of electronic components has grown more complex than ever. The gray market presents an opportunity for counterfeit electronic parts to enter the system, potentially leading to fatal incidents.
This blog will present the argument for why SAE standard AS6171 is currently regarded as the most accepted and comprehensive methodology to detect and ensure counterfeit EEE components do not enter critical products and systems current.